The first argument used the restriction of violent speech. It has long been an assertion that animal cruelty can be a predictor of future acts of violence against humans later in life. In fact, Wright and Hensley developed the graduation hypothesis after their 2003 study. Of 354 serial murderers studied, 21% had a history of animal cruelty earlier in life. However, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court made it very clear that the government could not restrict speech except in the case where the speech incited immediate unlawful action. Despite this suggested correlation between animal cruelty and future violence against humans, it is doubtful imminence could be proven. There could be merit in arguing the illegality of dog fighting and animal cruelty, and that the watching of these videos could encourage participation in the activities themselves. However, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the court said that "government may not prohibit speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed "at some indefinite future time,'" because "the mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it,". I think it is probably safe to say the violent speech argument isn’t going to be a particularly effective one.
The second argument is meant to rope violence in with obscene speech. Of course we all remember that in order to be considered obscene the average person must find it a) appeals to the prurient interest, b) depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and c) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The language of Title 18 section 48 mimics obscenity by qualifying animal cruelty depictions without any serious value as the only ones prohibited. Many also argue that violent speech can be just as obscene as sexual speech, and that violent speech serves to simply arouse viewers without any sort of intellectual stimulation just like sexual obscenity. However, unfortunately for this argument, the Supreme Court decided in Winters v. New York that depictions of crime and other violent actions meant solely for entertainment purposes were just as protected as those meant to inform. No First Amendment exception was made here for depictions of violence, so unless the Supreme Court would like to change this precedent, this seems unlikely to hold much weight either.
Lastly, animal rights activists hope exceptions to freedom of speech for child pornography cases will be similar enough to include animal cruelty. In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court decided child pornography was not protected because the creation caused harm to the child. The Court also cited that child pornography was fundamentally associated with child abuse, and therefore should not be protected under the First Amendment. Definitely a better argument here than the last two. Actually, this decision calls into question the first argument used against the constitutionality of the animal cruelty statute. Even though it was so careful in Ashcroft to assert the threat of illegal action had to be imminent, it seems to be contradicting itself here by citing the association with child pornography and child sexual abuse. If the Supreme Court was willing to change its mind once before, why not in this case I suppose? Also, animal rights activists could most certainly make the argument that just as children are harmed in the production of child pornography, animals are harmed in the creation of crush videos or dog fighting videos. It would seem it would then boil down to how similar in rights the Supreme Court considers animals to children. Perhaps not everyone believes the Founding Fathers meant the Constitution to apply to their furry friends. But I digress.
Ultimately, we will have to wait to see which if any of the previous arguments stick when the Supreme Court deliberates over this case. I personally don’t enjoy watching animals harmed in any way, but I also get a little more nervous each time the Supreme Court decides the First Amendment doesn’t protect another category of speech.
Also used :
Reynolds, Michael. " DEPICTIONS OF THE PIG ROAST: RESTRICTING VIOLENT SPEECH WITHOUT BURNING THE HOUSE." Southern California Law Review 82 (Jan. 2009): 341-387. LexisNexis Academic. LexisNexis. 20 Apr. 2009

I just posted my blog and realized we did the same topic. You make some good points that I read about but did not write about, including the New York v Ferber and Winters cases. I agree with you that this is going to be a tough decision for the Supreme Court. It will be interesting to see if they compare animals to children... it's a bit of a far reach though. Interesting topic! :-)
ReplyDeleteI have to admit that I'm really baffled at this from a legislative standpoint. I'm curious what the laws are about *performing* animal cruelty, especially for commercial gain. If I were a legislator, I would know that getting anywhere close to regulating speech is difficult politically. Instead of regulating the creation and distribution of speech about these cruel actions, I'd focus my efforts on providing more resources for enforcement of laws regulating the *action* of cruelty and increasing the penalties.
ReplyDeleteThen again, if I were a pragmatic legislator, I would realize that even if the law were struck down later as being unconstitional, what would I care? It's not like some punishment to me personally for passing a law that is later struck down. Perversely, I could easily pass it even if I found its First Amendment implications troubling, because I would get credit for addressing the problem while reassuring myself that it could be struck down later. This fascinating set of incentives came up in an article I read a few years ago about inseverability provisions in legislative acts. (http://www.albanylawreview.org/archives/68/4/AREINSEVERABILITYCLAUSESCONSTITUTIONAL.pdf) The McCain-Feingold bill (The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act) had strong opposition. Then the opposition successfully inserted an inseverability provision dictating that if any part of the act were found invalid, the whole act would be invalidated. The opposition knew that *something* in the Act had to be unconstitional, that it would be quickly challenged, and that the inseverability provision would kill the Act entirely. By supporting the Act with the new provision, they were able to reap the publicity benefits of supporting it while quietly neutering it.
Another fascinating article about the perverse incentives facing legislatures and public servants: http://www.mercatus.org/PDFDownload.aspx?contentID=16146
I know many object to both, but I feel that what legislators really want to combat is animal cruelty, not depictions of it. The problem is that many of these "crush videos" are imported from overseas from nations where laws against cruelty to animals are virtually nonexistant. We don't want U.S. Consumers paying to fund the creation of more crush videos, no matter where in the world they are filmed, and so we try to make it illegal to sell them here.
ReplyDeleteI agree that I do not like the idea of weakening the First Amendment. It would be difficult to put wording into a law preventing distribution of such films without being too broad. And even some of the classic films we still think well upon today were filmed in an era where animals were less protected, and may be banned under this law. Ben Hur comes to mind. http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/cruelcamera/cruelty.html Depending on your source, somewhere between 100 and 5 horses were killed during the shooting of a single scene of that movie. http://www.snopes.com/movies/films/benhur.asp
I would like to see harsher punishment for animal cruelty, and I think that we could combat the crush video industry by importation laws, rather than distribution laws, but I don't know if the First Amendment protects people importing videos from outside the country or not. I still don't think that an exception should be made in this case. It's the cruelty we want to fight, not the distribution, even if we don't like the sickos who watch the films, they have a Constitutional right to be weird.